Bounded Rationality, Learning, and Optimal Contracts

Suren Basov

Chapter Chapter 6 in Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts, 2016, pp 107-117 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we explicitly model the process of the decision making by economic agents. This gives rise to dynamic models of bounded rationality, where agents adjust their choices with time in a way they consider beneficial.

Keywords: Optimal Control Problem; Incentive Scheme; Bounded Rationality; Certainty Equivalent; Optimal Contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-981-10-1041-5_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5_6

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