Cournot duopoly and environmental R&D under regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax

Yasunori Ouchida () and Daisaku Goto

Applied Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 23, issue 5, 324-331

Abstract: This study examines the environmental R&D (E-R&D) of Cournot duopolists with end-of-pipe technology under a regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax. Under technological spillover effect, the government invariably prefers E-R&D cartelization to E-R&D competition. Highly contrary to earlier studies, consumer surplus is not necessarily maximized by environmental research joint venture cartelization, although this offers private and social incentives.

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Cournot duopoly and environmental R&D under regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax (2014)
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2015.1073831

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