Which Minority is Appeased? Coalition Potential and Redistribution in Latvia and Ukraine

Stephen Bloom

Europe-Asia Studies, 2008, vol. 60, issue 9, 1575-1600

Abstract: This article tests fiscal appeasement, needs-based and coalition potential hypotheses for redistribution in post-Soviet Latvia and Ukraine. I argue that the government's decision to reward a minority population depends on the coalition potential of minority parties and voters. In Latvia, the non-participation of minority parties in governing coalitions means that the distribution of spoils among coalition partners does not benefit the regions in which Russian speakers live. In Ukraine, on the other hand, voters and parties in western Ukraine have been sought out by Russian-speaking politicians from eastern Ukraine, and the districts of western Ukraine received preferential treatment as a result.

Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09668130802362326 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ceasxx:v:60:y:2008:i:9:p:1575-1600

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/ceas20

DOI: 10.1080/09668130802362326

Access Statistics for this article

Europe-Asia Studies is currently edited by Terry Cox

More articles in Europe-Asia Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().