Purchasing Power: Oil, Elections and Regime Durability in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan

Andrea Kendall-Taylor

Europe-Asia Studies, 2012, vol. 64, issue 4, 737-760

Abstract: This article examines the link between oil abundance and regime durability by providing insight into how and why oil-rich leaders use elections to maintain power. Using data from presidential elections in Central Asia, the article argues that oil-rich leaders are better able to manipulate their economies in the run-up to elections than their resource-poor counterparts. Oil-rich leaders use oil profits to increase pre-electoral spending to increase popular support, to deter potential opposition and to secure elite loyalty. Such electorally timed increases in spending help oil-rich leaders increase their re-election prospects and ensure their continued control over their countries' resources.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2012.671567

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