The Patrimonial Logic of the Police in Eastern Europe

Stephan Hensell

Europe-Asia Studies, 2012, vol. 64, issue 5, 811-833

Abstract: The police in Eastern Europe are often regarded as politicised, poorly trained and corrupt. This article argues that the police follow a patrimonial logic. Neo-patrimonialism is mostly understood as an authoritarian regime with a personal ruler at the top. By contrast, here a concept will be suggested which reformulates patrimonialism as the practice of the acquisition of offices and material resources. Based on this, two case studies analyse the police administration in Albania and Georgia. The findings suggest that patrimonial practices play a central role in the recruiting and financing of law enforcement officers. The result is a hybrid administration, which is significantly subject to special interests.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2012.681244

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