Explaining Governance of the Judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe: External Incentives, Transnational Elites and Parliamentary Inaction

Cristina E. Parau

Europe-Asia Studies, 2015, vol. 67, issue 3, 409-442

Abstract: What made democratic politicians in Central and Eastern Europe exclude themselves from governance of the judiciary? Institutional change in the judiciary is investigated through a diachronic study of the Romanian judiciary which reveals a complex causal nexus. The classical model of the ‘external incentives’ of EU accession, while explaining a general drive toward revision, played an otherwise marginal role. An institutional template prevailed, promoted by an elite transnational community of legal professionals whose entrepreneurs steering the revision of governance of the judiciary after 1989. The parliamentarians, disempowered by this revision, offered no resistance—a ‘veto-player dormancy’ that stands revealed as pre-conditional to such transnational influences.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2015.1016401

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