Judicial Disagreement need not be Political: Dissent on the Estonian Supreme Court

Chris Hanretty

Europe-Asia Studies, 2015, vol. 67, issue 6, 970-988

Abstract: I investigate the non-unanimous decisions of judges on the Estonian Supreme Court. I argue that since judges on the court enjoy high de jure independence, dissent frequently, and are integrated in the normal judicial hierarchy, the Estonian Supreme Court is a crucial case for the presumption that judicial disagreement reveals policy preferences. I analyse dissenting opinions using an ideal point response model. Examining the characteristics of cases which discriminated with respect to the recovered dimension, I show that this dimension cannot be interpreted as a meaningful policy dimension, but instead reflects disagreement about the proper scope of constitutional redress.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2015.1054260

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