Cherry Picking EU Conditionality: Selective Compliance in Georgia’s Hybrid Regime

Ketevan Bolkvadze

Europe-Asia Studies, 2016, vol. 68, issue 3, 409-440

Abstract: This article investigates the rationale behind compliance and non-compliance with EU conditionality in Georgia’s hybrid regime. Following the literature on competitive authoritarianism, it argues that the survival strategies of hybrid regime incumbents compel them to dodge conditionality in those policy areas that are crucial for maintaining the uneven political playing field. On the other hand, specific self-preservation tactics dictate that they should embrace neighbourhood Europeanisation in policy domains capable of generating votes. Taken together, these hypotheses alert us to the possibility that hybrid regime governments in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries are cherry picking conditionality.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09668136.2016.1154138 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ceasxx:v:68:y:2016:i:3:p:409-440

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/ceas20

DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2016.1154138

Access Statistics for this article

Europe-Asia Studies is currently edited by Terry Cox

More articles in Europe-Asia Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().