Administrative Cohesion and Anti-Corruption Reforms in Georgia and Ukraine

Peter Nasuti

Europe-Asia Studies, 2016, vol. 68, issue 5, 847-867

Abstract: Previous studies of former communist countries have linked decentralisation of power to a greater likelihood of reform. An analysis of the anti-corruption drives in Georgia and Ukraine after their respective ‘colour revolutions’, however, suggests that Georgia’s greater centralisation was integral to its success in enacting anti-corruption measures. In explaining why this contradictory result happened, this article argues that a centralised government can be more effective at implementing reforms than a decentralised one as long as the background and preferences of the ruling administration are conducive to change.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2016.1192107

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