Conflicting Opportunities or Patronal Politics? Restrictive NGO Legislation in Russia 2012–2015

Geir Flikke

Europe-Asia Studies, 2018, vol. 70, issue 4, 564-590

Abstract: After the 2011–2012 electoral protest cycles, the opportunity structures for a broad range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been narrowed. This essay argues that increased control over NGOs mirrors a deeper conflict of governance models, which is endogenous to the Russian political system, between bureaucratic modernisation and patronal politics. The modernisation sought by the Kremlin under Medvedev’s term brought a greater demand for organisations capable of fulfilling the dual purpose of public communication and state advisory functions. This required clear legal definitions, areas of competence and rules of conduct. However, patronal politics dictate that NGOs should bow to the state, and be governed by diffuse principles of loyalty.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2018.1455806

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