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To Resign or Not to Resign: Why Incumbents Ignore Peaceful Mass Protests

Nina Simeonova Barzachka

Europe-Asia Studies, 2020, vol. 72, issue 5, 763-791

Abstract: This article examines why incumbents facing non-violent demonstrations resign or remain in office. It presents a theoretical framework to analyse five major anti-government protests in Bulgaria (1990–2014) and select protests in Serbia, Romania and Macedonia. Incumbents remain in office if they perceive both the extra-institutional and electoral threats to them as low and unlikely to increase. They resign if either threat is high or increasing. To remove incumbents from power, peaceful protesters must employ an electoral strategy. This article builds on the social movement and colour revolution literatures, while underscoring the relationship between barricades and ballots.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2020.1741516

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