Principal–Agent Dynamics and Electoral Manipulation: Local Risks, Patronage and Tactical Variation in Russian Elections, 2003–2012

Cole J. Harvey

Europe-Asia Studies, 2020, vol. 72, issue 5, 837-862

Abstract: Why are some elections manipulated more severely than others, and why do the techniques used to manipulate them vary over time and space? This article addresses these related questions by showing that patronage resources—not incumbent popularity—make manipulation appealing to frontline agents, while local political conditions can make manipulation personally risky for them. Agents can mitigate these risks by adopting more dispersed forms of manipulation like vote-buying, rather than more centralised falsification. These hypotheses are tested using forensic analysis of electoral data from more than 90,000 precincts per election across Russia’s 83 regions, from 2003 to 2012.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2019.1681363

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