Arms export controls and emerging domestic producers

Paul Levine (), Fotis Mouzakis and Ronald Smith

Defence and Peace Economics, 2000, vol. 11, issue 3, 505-531

Abstract: The possibility of domestic production raises a difficulty for arms export control measures, since embargoes, by raising the effective price of imports, increase the incentive for domestic production. We address this issue by developing a partial equilibrium model of the international arms market We compare three arms export regimes involving the exporters of high-technology arms, with a particular focus on the effect of emerging domestic production: laissez-faire trade, the uncoordinated regulation of exports and a producer cartel consisting of coordinated regulation. The main conclusion is that the possibility of domestic production significantly changes the nature of these stylized export regimes.

Keywords: Arms trade; Emerging production; Regulation; Defence economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1080/10430710008404963

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