Competitive equilibrium and informational asymmetry in the private higher education market

Khang Do Ba and Hoa Quang Duong

Education Economics, 2018, vol. 26, issue 4, 432-443

Abstract: We develop two formal competitive models of the private higher education market focusing on quality and tuition where informational asymmetry is present: one consisting of for-profit universities only, and the other including also private non-profit universities. For both models, we characterize the competitive equilibrium to gain insights into the structure of this market. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to exist. The results demonstrate the spillover impact of non-profit universities on the overall market quality through reducing the information gap. The findings offer policy implications to improve the overall quality of this market.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09645292.2018.1451825 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:edecon:v:26:y:2018:i:4:p:432-443

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CEDE20

DOI: 10.1080/09645292.2018.1451825

Access Statistics for this article

Education Economics is currently edited by Caren Wareing and Steve Bradley

More articles in Education Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().