Public Service Broadcasting of Sport, Shows, and News to Mitigate Rational Ignorance

Julia Rothbauer and Gernot Sieg

Journal of Media Economics, 2013, vol. 26, issue 1, 21-40

Abstract: Rational individuals may use a tax or license-fee financed public service TV channel to mitigate the paradox of rational ignorance. The approach presented in this article assumes that increased consumption of information by voters improves democratic decisions, but marginal returns decrease. Depending on how fast marginal returns decrease, the public service TV channel broadcasts either only (unbiased serious) news or, to induce voters to watch the informational content, sports and shows (entertainment) as well.

Date: 2013
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Related works:
Working Paper: Public service broadcasting of sport, shows, and news as economic solution to the voter's paradox of rational ignorance (2010)
Working Paper: Public service broadcasting of sport, shows, and news as economic solution to the voter's paradox of rational ignorance (2010)
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DOI: 10.1080/08997764.2012.755985

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