Institutional design for credence goods: Can the existence of financial incentive be problematic? Evidences from childbirth system of Bangladesh

Hasan Muhammad Baniamin and Ishtiaq Jamil

International Journal of Public Administration, 2018, vol. 41, issue 14, 1192-1203

Abstract: The introduction of an incentive system in order to increase the provision of credence goods such as health services can be problematic. This article identifies the possible magnitude of overtreatment by physicians in private clinics compared with the situation in government and nongovernment health facilities in Bangladesh. The five to ten times higher volume of cesarean childbirths in private clinics (higher incentive institutions) compared with the volume in government/NGOs health facilities (lower incentive institutions) is indicative of the problem of overtreatment. This problem may become acute where there is only one private clinic in an area; however, the mere increase in the number of private clinics may not solve the problem.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01900692.2017.1362434 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:lpadxx:v:41:y:2018:i:14:p:1192-1203

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/lpad20

DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2017.1362434

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Public Administration is currently edited by Ali Farazmand

More articles in International Journal of Public Administration from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().