Public Resource Allocation through Grassroots Democratic Institutions: Evidence from Assam, India

Subodh Chandra Das and Gurudas Das

International Journal of Public Administration, 2018, vol. 41, issue 16, 1325-1337

Abstract: The success of democratic institutions at the grassroots level in allocating public benefits to the target groups depends on people’s political participation. Applying logistic regression, ordinary least squares (OLS), and the Heckman model based on a data set collected from 30 panchayats from three districts of Assam (India), this article addresses three questions: (a) who participates? (b) who gets the public benefits? and (c) whether participants get more benefits. The results suggest no overwhelming elite capture and clientalization, and contributes to the current debate on the association between democracy and development by way of establishing that democracy at the grassroots does, indeed, deliver.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2017.1387918

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