Transparency in the Procurement of Public Works

Xiaomei Deng, Qian Tian, Shizhao Ding and Bob Boase

Public Money & Management, 2003, vol. 23, issue 3, 155-162

Abstract: The construction contract bonding system is used worldwide to protect the owner of a project against the risk of non-performance by the contractor. There is a close relationship between the construction contract bonding system and transparency in public works, which policy-makers and officials need to be more aware of. There are mainly three systems in use, which the authors have analysed in depth. Each of the three models has a different influence on transparency in public works: the ‘high penalty conditional model’ is considered the most functional model in improving transparency, the ‘low penalty unconditional model’ does not contribute very much to improving transparency, while the ‘substitute contractor model’ can lead to greater opportunities for corruption on the contractor's side.

Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1111/1467-9302.00363

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