The impact of digital red tape on non-compliant behaviour: the moderating effect of infection risk

Qing Miao, Hui Yin, Gary Schwarz and Jinhao Huang

Public Money & Management, 2024, vol. 44, issue 7, 628-638

Abstract: This article will be of value to the digital governance policy-makers and particularly to those suffering from digital red tape across the public sector. It identifies Covid 19 digital pandemic prevention regulations as a counter-example, demonstrating the existence of digital red tape and revealing its impact on non-compliance. The more citizens viewed the regulations as digital red tape, the more dissatisfied they felt and the more they violated the regulations. The authors advise policy-makers to simplify burdensome, ineffective and non-necessary procedures when designing digital regulations to avoid citizen dissatisfaction. When perceived infection risk was high, dissatisfied citizens tended to comply with digital regulations. Conversely, non-compliance due to dissatisfaction with digital regulations increased significantly when citizens perceived the infection risk as low. To ensure compliance, eliminating dysfunctional rules and regulations was particularly important when the infection risk declined.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/09540962.2024.2301933

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