Autonomous bureaucrats in independent bureaucracies? Loyalty perceptions within supreme audit institutions

Alketa Peci and Osvaldo Cristian Rudloff Pulgar

Public Management Review, 2019, vol. 21, issue 1, 47-68

Abstract: The independence of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) is essential to their effectiveness, yet the actual autonomy of SAIs auditors can be questioned. To whom do SAI officials owe their loyalty? To what extent are their loyalty perceptions reflected in their auditing reports? Our comparative study triangulates interviews, direct observations, and documents and, based on Q methodology, constructs four types of SAI officials who disavow traditional loyalties to political appointees or external stakeholders but abide to Constitutional and professional rules as well as to their respective audit institutions. Loyalty perceptions reflect SAIs’ associational contexts and are related to different work outcomes.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2018.1438503

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