Asymmetric Information and Strategic Competition in Estate Agency

P. Bishop and P. Megicks

The Service Industries Journal, 2002, vol. 22, issue 2, 89-108

Abstract: Many service relationships are characterised by informational asymmetries with service providers having better information concerning service quality than purchasers. Under such circumstances, signals may develop to transmit information between buyers and sellers. The mix of signals will depend upon particular market, product and firm characteristics. An empirical investigation of the estate agency industry shows that contingent contracts, trust building activities and market segmentation may support high quality, high price strategies within the context of asymmetric information.

Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1080/714005074

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The Service Industries Journal is currently edited by Eileen Bridges, Professor Domingo Ribeiro, Ronald Goldsmith, Barry Howcroft and Youjae Yi

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