Endogenous Task Allocation and Intrafirm Bargaining: A Note

Martyna Marczak and Thomas Beissinger ()
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Thomas Beissinger: Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim

No tep0825, Economic Papers from Trinity College Dublin, Economics Department

Abstract: We develop a model that incorporates task-based production into a matching model with intrafirm wage bargaining. Unlike in existing task-based models, the representative firm derives the optimal task allocation as a function of capital and labor, rather than relative factor prices. Embedding this mechanism in a model with strategic employment choice, we show how the properties of task-level technology affect the extent of overhiring.

Keywords: task approach; search and matching; Stole-Zwiebel bargaining; overhiring; wage bargaining; elasticity of complementarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 E23 J23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tcd:tcduee:tep0825

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