Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule

, () and , ()
Additional contact information
,: JSPS Research Fellow/Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University
,: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Shigehiro Serizawa

Theoretical Economics, 2015, vol. 10, issue 2

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The ``minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule'' is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the unique rule satisfying \textit{strategy-proofness}, \textit{efficiency}, \textit{individual rationality}, and \textit{no subsidy for losers}. Since the outcome of the MPW rule coincides with that of the simultaneous ascending (SA) auction, our result supports SA auctions adopted by many governments.

Keywords: Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium; simultaneous ascending auction; strategy-proofness; efficiency; heterogeneous objects; non-quasi-linear preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05-27
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20150445/13031/393 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:1470

Access Statistics for this article

Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Federico Echenique, Mira Frick, Pablo Kurlat, Juuso Toikka, Rakesh Vohra

More articles in Theoretical Economics from Econometric Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Martin J. Osborne ().