Contracting over persistent information

Wei Zhao (), Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala
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Wei Zhao: School of Economics, Renmin University of China

Theoretical Economics, 2024, vol. 19, issue 2

Abstract: We consider a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the principal's preferred action. We show that there exists an optimal policy, where the principal recommends its most preferred action and discloses information as a reward in the next period, until either this action becomes statically optimal for the agent or the agent perfectly learns the state.

Keywords: Dynamic; contract; information; revelation; disclosure; sender; receiver; persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05-13
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Contracting over Persistent Information (2022)
Working Paper: Contracting over persistent information (2021)
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