The limits of crowdfunding with common values
Matthew Ellman () and
Sjaak Hurkens ()
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Matthew Ellman: Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona School of Economics
Sjaak Hurkens: Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and BSE
Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
Abstract:
This paper characterizes the efficiency limits of crowdfunding when investors can inspect quality after the profit-maximizing entrepreneur sets an aggregate threshold and individual return on investor bids. As the investor crowd grows large, crowdfunding asymptotically achieves the first-best if information is free. Informative bidding by a vanishing fraction of the crowd then almost certainly ensures full funding of good projects and none for bad ones. However, with positive information costs, bad projects necessarily get funded in proportion to the cost of precise information. Above a cost cut-off, crowdfunding adds nothing to standard investment contracts.
Keywords: Information acquisition; information aggregation; wisdom of crowds; asymptotic efficiency; common value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 G23 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:6910
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