Strategy-proof voting for multiple public goods

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,: Department of Economics, Lund University
,: Department of Economics, Lund University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Alexander Reffgen and Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Theoretical Economics, 2012, vol. 7, issue 3

Abstract: In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times\cdots\ldots{}A_m$ of $m$ finite categories, we characterize the set of all strategy-proof social choice functions for three different types of preference domains over $A$, namely for the domains of additive, completely separable, and weakly separable preferences over $A$.

Keywords: Multiple public goods; strategy-proofness; voting under constraints; additive preferences; separable preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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