On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information

Maarten C.W. Janssen and Emiel Maasland
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Maarten C.W. Janssen: University of Vienna, Austria

No 97-073/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information aboutdemand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibriumis perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posteriorbeliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.

Date: 1997-07-03
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Working Paper: On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information (1997)
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