On Harsanyi Payoff Vectors and the Weber Set

Jean Derks, Gerard van der Laan and Valery Vasil'ev ()

No 02-105/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: The paper discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors,also known as the Selectope. First, we reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors, published by Vasil'ev in the late 1970's, within a more general framework. In particular, these results state already that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is given by the core of an associated convex game, a result that recently has been proven by Derks et. al.(2000). The marginal contribution vectors are examples of Harsanyi payoff vectors so that the Weber set, being the convex hull of the marginal contribution vectors, is a subset of the Harsanyi set, which denotes the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors. We provide two characterizations of those Harsanyi payoff vectors that are elements of the Weber set.

Keywords: TU-games; Core; Harsanyi set; Weber set; Selectope. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-10-21
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/02105.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20020105

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().