Demand Adjustment in Coalitional Games

Gerard van der Laan and Vitaly Pruzhansky ()
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Vitaly Pruzhansky: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

No 04-121/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively simple games various inefficiencies can arise.

Keywords: Aspirations; bargaining set; core; von Neumann-Morgenstern vector; stable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-11-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040121

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