Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility

Rene van den Brink () and Yukihiko Funaki ()

No 04-136/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: See also the publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2009, 67, 303-340. A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss a class of solutions containing all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value, and the egalitarian solution. We characterize this class of solutions using a general standardness for two player games and reduced game consistency. Specific cases of these properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

Keywords: TU-game; Equal surplus sharing; CIS-value; ENSC-value; Egalitarian solution; Reduced Game Consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-12-16
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/04136.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040136

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().