Games on Union Closed Systems

Rene van den Brink (), Ilya Katsev and Gerard van der Laan
Additional contact information
Ilya Katsev: Russian Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg

No 11-036/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to every TU-game. In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. So, instead of allowing all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of N. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value) are given for games on union closed systems.

Keywords: TU-game; restricted cooperation; union closed system; core; prekernel; nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-14
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/11036.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110036

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().