Independence Axioms for Water Allocation

Rene van den Brink (), Arantza Estevez-Fernandez, Gerard van der Laan and Nigel Moes
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Arantza Estevez-Fernandez: VU University Amsterdam
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arantza Estévez Fernández

No 11-128/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper led to the article with the same title in 'Social Choice and Welfare' (2014), 43, 173-194.

We consider the problem of sharing water among agents located along a river. Each agent has quasi-linear preferences over river water and money, where the benefit of consuming an amount of water is given by a continuous and concave benefit function. A solution to the problem efficiently distributes the river water over the agents and wastes no money. We introduce a number of (independence) axioms to characterize two new and two existing solutions. We apply the solutions to the particular case that every agent has constant marginal benefit of one up to a satiation point and marginal benefit of zero thereafter. In this case we find that two of the solutions (one existing and one new) can be implemented without monetary transfers between the agents.

Keywords: Water allocation; Harmon doctrine; concave benefit function; stability; externality; independence axiom; water claim (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110128

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