Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure

Rene van den Brink (), Gerard van der Laan and Nigel Moes

No 11-164/1, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in 'TOP' , 2015, 23(1), 77-99.

In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph-partition restricted TU-game is obtained by taking the Myerson graph restricted game and of that the Kamijo partition restricted game. In this game the dividend of any coalition that is neither a subset of a union nor a union of unions is zero. The partition-graph restricted TU-game is obtained by taking the partition restricted game and of that the graph restricted game. In this game the dividend of any coalition that is not connected in the graph is zero. We apply the values to an economic example in which the players in a union represent the cities in a country and the graph represents a network of natural gas pipelines between the cities.

Keywords: cooperative games; coalition structures; graphs; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-16
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/11164.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110164

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().