Bargaining Power and Quantity Discounts to Retailers: Evidence from India’s Pharmaceutical Industry
Gianluca Antonecchia,
Ajay Bhaskarabhatla and
Enrico Pennings
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Gianluca Antonecchia: KU Leuven
Ajay Bhaskarabhatla: Erasmus School of Economics
Enrico Pennings: Erasmus School of Economics
No 24-048/VII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute
Abstract:
This paper develops a novel theory linking quantity discounts to bargaining power in scenarios where retailers, organized as a trade association, negotiate uni- form wholesale prices with suppliers. Our theory predicts that suppliers offer greater quantity discounts in regional markets where they possess relatively less bargaining power, as a counterbalance to the higher national wholesale prices negotiated by the retailer trade association. We test these predictions using detailed product-level data from the Indian pharmaceutical industry, where significant geographic variations in quantity discounts are observed. Our findings provide empirical support for the proposed theory.
Keywords: quantity discounts; bargaining power; pharmaceuticals; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 L11 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20240048
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