Vertical Integration in Auction Markets

Sander Onderstal and Ruben van Oosten
Additional contact information
Sander Onderstal: University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute
Ruben van Oosten: University of Amsterdam

No 25-046/VII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We analyze vertical integration in auction markets using a symmetric independent private-values model where the auctioneer invests in the auctioned object's quality. We find that the auctioneer invests more after integration. The integrated bidder enjoys a bidding advantage over other bidders. The merging parties benefit from integration, while non-merging bidders are worse off. In a platform setting where the auctioneer is an intermediary and the bidders are sellers on her platform, vertical integration has ambiguous effects on consumer surplus and total welfare. Our results contribute to the ongoing policy debate about platforms self-preferencing, effective competition policy, and digital market regulation.

JEL-codes: D44 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://papers.tinbergen.nl/25046.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250046

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 ().