Blockchains and Strategic Secondary Censorship

Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou and Maarten R.C. van Oordt
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Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou: Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas
Maarten R.C. van Oordt: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

No 26-069/IV, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: Censorship resistance is often considered to be a core attribute of distributed ledgers. Censorship resistance refers to the inability to selectively exclude technically valid but undesirable transactions from the blockchain. We examine blockchain censorship in a game-theoretic framework that allows for both primary and secondary censorship. The analysis identifies scenarios in which both inclusion and censorship equilibria exist. Once an equilibrium with strategic secondary censorship is implemented, it may be hard to revert to inclusion: Censorship equilibria are perfectly coalition-proof if the negative impact of an undesirable transaction on block producers is sufficiently large. These results highlight the growing importance of research into methods shaping censorship resistance at the technical layer.

Keywords: Blockchain; Consensus; Cryptocurrency; Distributed ledger; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 G2 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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