Truth, Lies, and Social Ties: When Image Concerns Fuel Fake News

Dana Sisak and Philipp Denter
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Dana Sisak: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Philipp Denter: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

No 26-072/VII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: We study how social image concerns shape information sharing among peers. Individuals receive a signal about a binary state with an observable direction and a veracity that can be learned only through costly verification, which depends on type. We analyze two motives: a desire to appear competent and a desire to signal one's worldview. For each, we characterize equilibrium sharing, derive implications for the relative diffusion of true versus false news, and compare welfare. The two motives can both generate greater sharing of false than factual news but imply distinct, testable patterns which we relate to existing empirical evidence.

Keywords: P2P Information Sharing; Social Image; Signaling; Fake News (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09-20
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