Representation over Rents: The Broad-Coalition Norm in Dutch Local Politics

Lotte Swank, Otto Swank and Joes de Natris
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Lotte Swank: University of Groningen
Otto Swank: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Joes de Natris: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

No 26-076/VII, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: In multi-party parliamentary democracies, governments emerge from post-election bargaining. We study coalition formation in Dutch municipalities. Bargaining models and a norm that "the largest party should govern" predict that party rank affects coalition formation. Using regression discontinuity designs, we find no causal effect of party rank on coalition inclusion. Instead, governments follow a broad-coalition logic: when two parties jointly win a narrow majority, they nevertheless include a third party in 95\% of cases. Parties that participate in coalitions excluding a relatively large party are less likely to enter the next coalition, consistent with dynamic penalties for violating a broad-coalition norm.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Bargaining models; Regression Discontinuity Design; Democratic norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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