Weighted Allocation Rules for Standard Fixed Tree Games

Endre Jostein Bjørndal, M.A.L. Koster and S.H. Tijs
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M.A.L. Koster: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research
S.H. Tijs: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 1999-79, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: cooperative game theory; tree games; core; weighted Shapley value; nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Journal Article: Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games (2004)
Working Paper: Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games (2004)
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