Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess

Michihiro Kandori and Ichiro Obara

No CIRJE-F-246, CIRJE F-Series from CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo

Abstract: We present a repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring, which exhibits the following paradoxical feature: the equilibrium payoff set expands and asymptotically achieves full efficiency as the public signal becomes less sensitive to the hiden actions of the players.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2003-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind
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Related works:
Journal Article: Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games (2006)
Working Paper: Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tky:fseres:2003cf246

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