Meetings with costly participation

Martin Osborne, Jeffry Rosenthal and Matthew Turner

Working Papers from University of Toronto, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study a collective decision-making process in which people who are interested in an issue are invited to attend a meeting, and the policy chosen is a compromise among the preferences of those who show up. We show that in an equilibrium the number of attendees is small and their positions are extreme; in a wide range of circumstances the outcome is random. These characteristics of an equilibrium are consistent with evidence on the outcome of hearings on US regulatory policy.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1998-05-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Meetings with Costly Participation (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tor:tecipa:mturner-98-02

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