Container Port Pricing Structure: A Vertical Market Model

Leonardo J. Basso, Sergio Jara-Diaz () and José Muñoz-Figueroa

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2017, vol. 51, issue 2, 75--94

Abstract: Abstract A three-stage game is used to model interactions between users, a shipping company, and a container port. Emphasis is placed on modelling the many services provided and priced by a port in order to compare pricing structures and price levels, and the subsequent division of surplus between agents under different port objectives (profit maximisation, efficiency, and second best). We find a strong trade-off between the benefits of the shipping company and those of the port, where the access price (a proxy for a fixed fee) is the preferred instrument to extract/inject surplus, while the other prices induce desired behaviours downstream.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:2017:51:2:75--94

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