Unions and Collective Bargaining in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Insights from Quantitative Studies

Uwe Jirjahn

No 2025-01, Research Papers in Economics from University of Trier, Department of Economics

Abstract: This article reviews quantitative research on unions and collective bargaining in Sub-Saharan Africa. It discusses the consequences of unions for wages, inequality, economic performance and employer-employee relations. The article also highlights the role of unions in society, a role that goes beyond the economic sphere. Moreover, the article discusses evidence on how the specific situation in Sub-Saharan Africa influences unionization and collective bargaining. The informal sector, ethnic divide and globalization entail serious threats to workers’ unionization. The increasing influence of China and neoliberal policy prescriptions by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are challenging factors, too.

Keywords: Africa; Industrial Relations; Political Spillover; Informal Sector; Ethnic Diversity; Globalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F66 J51 J52 O10 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr
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Related works:
Working Paper: Unions and Collective Bargaining in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Insights from Quantitative Studies (2025)
Working Paper: Unions and Collective Bargaining in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Insights from Quantitative Studies (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:trr:wpaper:202501

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