Who Shares Risk with Whom under Different Enforcement Mechanisms?

Abigail Barr, Marleen Dekker and Marcel Fafchamps

Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2012, vol. 60, issue 4, 677 - 706

Abstract: We investigate whether available enforcement mechanisms affect who shares risk with whom in sub-Saharan Africa, by applying dyadic regression analysis to data from a lab-type experiment, surveys, and a genealogical-mapping exercise. During the experiment, participants were invited to form risk-sharing groups under three enforcement mechanisms: external, intrinsic, and extrinsic (i.e., social sanctioning). Same-sex dyads and dyads who belong to the same economic community-based organizations (CBOs) are more likely to share risk. However, when social sanctioning is possible, comembers in economic CBOs withdraw from group formation and coreligion, and marriage ties come to the fore.

Date: 2012
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