Intrahousehold Allocation and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Chile

Claudia Martínez A.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Claudia Martínez A.

Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2013, vol. 61, issue 3, 577 - 605

Abstract: Until 1999, children born out of wedlock in Chile had fewer child support rights than those born to married couples. I interpret a change in this law as an increase in the household bargaining power of women in cohabiting relationships. Using a panel of cross-sectional data, I find a decrease of 1.8 percentage points in the probability of working among men and an increase of 1.2 percentage points in school attendance of children under 19. These results provide evidence that contradicts the predictions of the unitary household model as well as the Nash bargaining model. The labor market outcomes support a model in which a reduction in men's relative bargaining power is understood as a tax on their wages.

Date: 2013
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