Intergovernmental Interaction in Compliance with an International Environmental Agreement

Stefan Borsky and Paul Raschky

Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 2015, vol. 2, issue 2, 161 - 203

Abstract: This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of intergovernmental interaction in countries' compliance with an international environmental agreement (IEA). We use two cross-sectional data sets that contain information on signatory countries' compliance with an IEA on responsible fisheries. Our empirical strategy is based on estimating a spatial Durbin model using a maximum likelihood procedure. The results show that compliance effort by other participants has a systematic positive effect on a country's own compliance. We argue that these findings provide empirical evidence that intergovernmental relations can improve the performance of voluntary IEAs where other formal sanction mechanisms are absent.

Date: 2015
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