Do Payments for Environmental Services Affect Forest Access and Social Preferences in the Long Run? Experimental Evidence from Uganda

Tobias Vorlaufer, Joost de Laat and Stefanie Engel

Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, 2023, vol. 10, issue 2, 389 - 412

Abstract: Conservation policies and programs may trigger unintended, potentially irreversible, changes that were initially not anticipated. Concerns have been raised that the introduction of payments for environmental services (PES) fosters the privatization of natural ecosystems to the detriment of marginalized groups. We assess the long-term impacts of PES on sharing of access to natural resources, associated norms, and social preferences. The studied PES program was implemented as a randomized control trial in western Uganda. Using survey and experimental data collected six years after the last payments were made, we find that the PES program did not lead to a lasting shift in resource sharing practices but did induce stronger social norms for resource sharing. Moreover, landowners in former PES villages exhibit more egalitarian social preferences than landowners in control villages. These results highlight that despite introducing unequal conservation benefits to communities, long-lasting negative spillovers of PES could be avoided.

Date: 2023
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