Ability, Promotion, and Optimal Retirement

Steven Stern ()

Journal of Labor Economics, 1994, vol. 12, issue 1, 119-37

Abstract: This article considers a model in which the productivity of a worker depends on his experience, ability, and position in the firm. It is shown that workers are sorted in positions based on comparative advantage. Furthermore, workers are induced to retire when productivity is equal to the value of time after adjusting for the reallocation of other workers by positions that would occur if the worker retired. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1994
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