Promotion and Optimal Retirement

Steven Stern ()

Journal of Labor Economics, 1987, vol. 5, issue 4, S107-23

Abstract: In this paper, a firm maximizes profits over choices of wage schedul es and hiring schedules in a model with (1) turnover costs, (2) a pro ductivity function that depends on position and experience, and (3) employee utility functions that depend on monetary compensation and position. It is shown that firms may have reason to encourage employe es to retire before their reservation wage is greater than their marg inal product. However, if an alternative definition of marginal produ ct is used, the usual relation holds. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1987
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