The Law and Positive Political Theory of Panel Effects

Emerson H. Tiller

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2015, vol. 44, issue S1, S35 - S58

Abstract: This article presents a robust theory of panel effects by integrating the key "law" components of judicial decision making--doctrines and decision instruments--with the judicial hierarchy (principal-agent) components that dominate much of the panel effects literature. The refined model illustrates how doctrines, instruments, and the level of decision transparency between lower and higher courts condition the impact of panel effects on judicial decision making. The implications of recent empirical findings of panel effects are reevaluated through this more refined perspective.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682693 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682693 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/682693

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Legal Studies from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().